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A FRAMEWORK FOR ALTERNATIVE 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: SHIFTING 
FROM DRILLING RIGS TO RENEWABLES 
Timothy Holahan* 
Abstract: In the age of $100-a-barrel oil and global warming, the devel-
opment of sources of alternative energy is a critical component of politi-
cal and popular discourse. Recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in-
creased funding and tax credits for clean alternative energy. Several 
projects involving industry and local regulators have been progressing 
through the planning and development stages. Yet, despite the favorable 
political and regulatory climate surrounding alternative energy projects, 
such projects continue to encounter resistance because of projected costs 
and local “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) concerns. One program which 
would minimize costs and NIMBY-type reactions is “Rigs to Renewables,” 
which would place renewable energy stations on obsolete offshore oil rigs. 
In order to establish an adequate legal and regulatory framework for this 
program, its creators should incorporate the strengths of the existing 
“Rigs to Reefs” program, while improving on its weaknesses. 
Introduction 
 As concerns about traditional sources of energy have grown, gov-
ernment, industry, and media have paid increasing attention to the 
development of potential alternative energy sources.1 The Energy Pol-
icy Act of 2005 increased funding for clean alternative energy by 
twenty-two percent and included tax credits and additional incentives 
for alternative energy development.2 Several major alternative energy 
projects are in the planning and permitting stages.3 Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2007–08. 
1 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.); U.S. Dep’t of Energy, On the Road to Energy Secu-
rity 1 (2006), available at http://www.energy.gov/media/FINAL_8-14_DOE_booklet_copy_ 
sep.pdf. 
2 Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2102 (2005); U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra 
note 1, at 1, 4. Among the Energy Policy Act’s incentives is an extension of federal tax 
credits for the development of solar, wind, and biomass energy sources. Id. at 4. The Act 
also streamlines the licensing procedure for hydroelectric plants. Id. 
3 Nat’l Comm’n on Energy Policy, Siting Critical Energy Infrastructure: An 
Overview of Needs and Challenges 1–2 (2006), available at http://www.energycommis- 
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many of these projects have encountered resistance in the project sit-
ing stage.4 Local governments, interest groups, and ordinary citizens 
often recognize the potential benefits of the projects, but dispute the 
choice of the site closest to them.5 Such local opposition has been re-
ferred to pejoratively as “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome be-
cause these groups oppose the projects despite the potential benefits 
simply because of the projects’ proximity to their residences.6 
 Given such local opposition, it would be beneficial to renewable 
energy development to implement projects that minimize potential ob-
jections on siting grounds.7 One such project, proposed by the Ocean 
Renewable Energy Coalition (OREC), would use old offshore oil rigs as 
renewable energy stations.8 The rigs would form the platform on which 
structures that harness renewable energy would be placed.9 Tentatively 
called “Rigs to Renewables,” the project would adequately address most 
NIMBY concerns because oil rigs are located miles offshore.10 
 Rigs to Renewables would also have the advantage of creating a use 
for rigs that the oil industry otherwise would be required to disassemble, 
at great cost both to industry and to the environment.11 This element of 
                                                                                                                      
sion.org/files/contentFiles/Siting%20Critical%20Energy%20Infrastructure_448851db5fa7d. 
pdf. Examples of such projects include the Cape Wind project off the Massachusetts coast, 
a projected cross-channel transmission line from Connecticut to Long Island, and efforts 
to locate liquefied natural gas terminals in New Jersey and Maine. Id. 
4 Id. at 2; Shalini P. Vajjhala, Resources for the Future, Siting Renewable En-
ergy Facilities: A Spatial Analysis of Promises and Pittfalls 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-06-34.pdf. 
5 See Nat’l Comm’n on Energy Policy, supra note 3, at 2. 
6 Robert D. Kahn, Siting Struggles: The Unique Challenge of Permitting Renewable Energy 
Power Plants, Electricity J., Mar. 2000, at 21, 26. The NIMBY syndrome has become such 
a recognized part of planning for project siting that it has been supplemented by a new 
term, BANANA, which stands for “build absolutely nothing anywhere near anything.” 
Vajjhala, supra note 4, at 3. 
7 Nat’l Comm’n on Energy Policy, supra note 3, at 1; see Vajjhala, supra note 4, at 5. 
8 Ocean Renewable Energy Coalition, OREC Works with Others to Secure Funding for 
Ocean Energy ( July 9, 2006), http://www.oceanrenewable.com/2006/07/09/orec-works-
with-others-to-secure-funding-for-ocean-energy; see John Geoghegan, Inherit the Wind, Wired, 
Feb. 15, 2007, at 34. 
9 Developing Untapped Potential: Geothermal and Ocean Power Technologies: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Energy and Environment, H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 110th Cong. 58, 63 
(2007) (statement of Sean O’Neill, President, Ocean Renewable Energy Coalition); Geog-
hegan, supra note 8, at 34. 
10 See Geoghegan, supra note 8, at 34. 
11 See Les Dauterive, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Rigs-to-Reefs Policy, Progress, 
and Perspective, at iv (2000), available at http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PDFs/2000/2000-
073.pdf; Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Offshore Facility De-
commissioning Costs: Pacific OCS Region, at ii tbl.1 (2004), available at 
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the program would provide incentives for the participation of the oil 
industry, which traditionally has been opposed to renewable energy pro-
jects.12 Furthermore, Rigs to Renewables would minimize NIMBY oppo-
sition, while taking advantage of the favorable political and regulatory 
climate regarding renewable energy development.13 
 In addition to its compelling political and economic incentives, 
Rigs to Renewables would require a proper regulatory and legal frame-
work to operate effectively.14 This framework must allow Rigs to Renew-
ables to achieve its policy objectives, while addressing legal issues that 
will inevitably arise in a program that involves extensive cooperation 
between government and industry.15 Because the government will play 
an active role in the placement and development of rigs in government 
waters, federal legislation and regulation likely will form the backbone 
of this framework.16 The program must delineate what government 
agencies have jurisdiction, and should describe procedures for site se-
lection, permitting, and construction of renewable energy stations.17 
Moreover, because Rigs to Renewables involves the use of private indus-
try assets—oil rigs—for the public good, the framework must also de-
fine the role of private parties in the program, including the extent of 
private legal liability if an accident occurs on a rig during the imple-
mentation of the program.18 
 There are two potential options in addressing the issues that will 
arise in the development of Rigs to Renewables. The first option is to 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.mms.gov/omm/pacific/lease/2004_final_decommissioning_cost_report_rev_
1.pdf [hereinafter Decommissioning Costs]. 
12 See Dauterive, supra note 11, at iv; see, e.g., Jon Birger Skjaerseth & Tora Skodvin, 
Climate Change and the Oil Industry: Common Problems, Different Strategies, Global Envtl. 
Pol., Nov. 2001, at 43, 44 (discussing American oil companies’ opposition to the Kyoto 
Protocol and reluctance to support renewable energy technology). 
13 See Geoghegan, supra note 8, at 34; U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 1, at 1. 
14 See Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Artificial 
Reef Plan (as Amended): Guidelines for Siting, Construction, Development, and 
Assessment of Artificial Reefs 1 (2007), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/ 
PartnershipsCommunications/NARPwCover3.pdf [hereinafter Reef Plan Revision]; see, e.g., 
Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Decommissioning and Removal of 
Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California: Recent Experiences and Future Deep-
water Challenges 18 (Frank Manago & Bonnie Williamson eds., 1997), available at http:// 
www.mms.gov/omm/pacific/lease/Decommissioning/1998-023%20I.pdf [hereinafter De-
commissioning and Removal] (describing the regulatory framework for the decommission-
ing of oil and gas facilities). 
15 See Dauterive, supra note 11, at 1, 5; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 28. 
16 See National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106 (2000); 
Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1. 
17 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1, 4. 
18 See 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c); Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 14, 45–47. 
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create an entirely new legal and regulatory framework.19 The second 
option is to model Rigs to Renewables after an existing program with 
similar goals and methods, such as the Rigs to Reefs program, which 
was established in 1984.20 Incorporating aspects of the legal and regula-
tory framework of Rigs to Reefs into Rigs to Renewables would not only 
be more efficient than creating entirely new guidelines, but would also 
ensure that the successful aspects of Rigs to Reefs are incorporated ef-
fectively into Rigs to Renewables.21 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Rigs to Reefs pro-
gram. Because offshore oil rigs are the key resource in Rigs to Reefs, 
this part focuses on how rigs function, how the program uses them, and 
how decommissioning regulations govern the transition from rig to 
reef. Part II explains Rigs to Reefs’ regulatory structure: federal ena-
bling legislation established the program, a national plan describes the 
program’s basic characteristics, and state plans provide the details nec-
essary for the program’s implementation.22 Part III explains how Rigs 
to Renewables should incorporate the hierarchal structure that is the 
strength of Rigs to Reefs, while avoiding the inflexibility that limits the 
program’s effectiveness. 
I. Description of the Rigs to Reefs Program 
 Every offshore oil rig has the same basic structure and function.23 
Oil is extracted through holes dug in the ocean floor known as wells.24 
The drill that creates the holes is the rig.25 The structure that sits atop 
the well and extracts the oil is the platform.26 The term rig is com-
monly used to refer to what is actually the platform—thus, the name 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1. 
20 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1. The NFEA’s 
purpose is “to promote and facilitate responsible and effective efforts to establish artificial 
reefs in waters covered under this chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 2101(b). The National Artificial 
Reef Plan describes the purpose of Rigs to Reefs as an effort to preserve and enhance fish-
eries for commercial and recreational use by using obsolete oil rigs as breeding ground for 
marine life. Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1. 
21 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 4. 
22 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 4, 11; see, e.g., La. 
Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, Louisiana Artificial Reef Plan, at vii (1987). 
23 Mark J. Kaiser & Allan G. Pulsipher, Rigs-to-Reef Programs in the Gulf of Mexico, 36 
Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 119, 119–21 (2005). There is some variation in the rig structure, 
but all structures consist of the same three elements: the rig itself---the drilling equip-
ment—the platform supporting the rig, and the jacket supporting the platform. Id. at 121. 
24 See id. at 121, 124. 
25 See id. at 121. 
26 See id. 
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Rigs to Reefs refers to converting oil platforms to reefs.27 It is these 
platforms that form the supporting structures for fish habitats.28 
 Under the Rigs to Reefs program, private rig owners donate rigs to 
state governments, which then convert the rigs to artificial reefs.29 Rigs 
to Reefs developed from a joint initiative of two federal agencies—the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the National Marine Fisher-
ies Service (NMFS).30 At the time that these two agencies started the 
program, a significant number of oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico had re-
cently stopped producing oil.31 The MMS regulations required that the 
oil companies that owned the rigs disassemble them and remove them 
from the water.32 Left in the water, the rigs were a potential hazard to 
ship navigation and to the environment.33 However, removing the rigs 
was costly for industry.34 Rigs to Reefs created a means for industry to 
avoid much of the cost of decommissioning by leaving the rigs intact in 
the water.35 
 Not only was Rigs to Reefs advantageous for industry, but the pro-
gram would benefit environmentalists, as well as commercial and rec-
                                                                                                                      
27 See id. 
28 Id. at 120. 
29 Kaiser & Pulsipher, supra note 24, at 119; Dauterive, supra note 11, at iv. 
30 Dauterive, supra note 11, at 1. The MMS is a department of the U.S. Department of 
the Interior. Id. The NMFS is a department of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Reef 
Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
31 Kaiser & Pulsipher, supra note 23, at 119, 120 fig.1. For example, as late as 1986, ap-
proximately twenty oil structures were removed from the Gulf of Mexico for lack of pro-
duction; by 2003, over 140 structures were removed from the Gulf of Mexico for lack of 
production. Id. at 120 fig.1. 
32 Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—De-
commissioning Activities, 30 C.F.R. § 250.1703 (2007) (describing general requirements 
for decommissioning). The MMS refers to the process of disassembling a rig and removing 
it from the water as decommissioning the rig. Id. The MMS has jurisdiction over offshore 
oil extraction. Outer Continental Shelf Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1334(a) 
(2000). The MMS is responsible for leasing the rights to mineral exploration and extrac-
tion on federally owned land, and for regulating the operation of the facilities used in the 
exploration and extraction process. Id. §§ 1331(a), 1334(a). 
33 See 30 C.F.R. § 250.1700(b); Kaiser & Pulsipher, supra note 23, at 124. 
34 Decommissioning Costs, supra note 11, at ii & tbl.1. The cost to industry of de-
commissioning varies depending on the particular site and facilities involved. Id. at i. One 
MMS report estimated decommissioning costs of individual platforms in the Pacific outer 
continental shelf. Id. at ii. The least expensive platform cost approximately $10 million to 
decommission, the most expensive platform cost $129 million, and the average cost of 
decommissioning a platform was approximately $43 million. See id. at ii tbl.1. 
35 See Dauterive, supra note 11, at iv. That is not to say that the oil industry may avoid 
all costs associated with decommissioning. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.1710. Rig owners that 
donate a rig to Rigs to Reefs must still ensure that the rig has been properly cleaned and 
plugged to prevent any remaining oil from leaking into the surrounding environment. Id. 
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reational fishermen.36 Oil rigs provide ideal habitats for many species of 
fish and other marine life.37 Using oil rigs as breeding grounds for ma-
rine life would serve conservation interests by providing additional 
habitats for many species, while providing additional sources of fish for 
commercial and recreational fishermen.38 
 Not all interested parties agreed that Rigs to Reefs was a good 
idea.39 Indeed, some environmentalists claimed that leaving rigs in the 
water in any form was detrimental to the surrounding environment.40 
The MMS attempted to address this concern by requiring that rigs do-
nated to Rigs to Reefs comply with the basic environmental require-
ments of the decommissioning regulations.41 The MMS designed its 
decommissioning regulations to minimize the environmental impact of 
obsolete rigs to the greatest extent possible.42 
 Under Rigs to Reefs, basic decommissioning requirements still ap-
ply; however, the MMS exempts rig owners from the more onerous de-
commissioning regulations.43 The MMS requires rig owners to under-
take three principal steps under Rigs to Reefs, each of which requires 
them to address the potential environmental impact of decommission-
ing.44 First, rig owners must get approval from the appropriate the 
MMS supervisor before decommissioning a rig or the facilities support-
                                                                                                                      
36 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
37 MMS, Artificial Reefs: Oases for Marine Life in the Gulf, http://www.gomr.mms.gov/ 
homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-to-reefs/artificial-reefs.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2008). Oil 
rigs are a particularly ideal habitat in the Gulf of Mexico, which has a flat, sandy bottom gen-
erally not suitable as a habitat for most types of marine life. Id. The oil platforms provide 
points around which marine life can congregate and grow. Id. 
38 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 2–3. For example, one study estimated that 
seventy percent of Louisiana fishing expeditions target oil platforms converted into artifi-
cial reefs, which is a testament to the effectiveness of oil platforms as breeding grounds for 
marine life. See Donna M. Schroeder & Milton S. Love, Ecological and Political Issues Sur-
rounding Decommissioning of Offshore Oil Facilities in the Southern California Bight, 47 Ocean & 
Coastal Mgmt. 21, 21–30 (2004). 
39 Schroeder & Love, supra note 38, at 30. Some community groups opposed Rigs to 
Reefs simply because the oil companies seemed to reap excessive benefits from the pro-
gram. Id. For example, a representative from one group opposed to Rigs to Reefs in Cali-
fornia stated, “We’re not convinced that the alleged scientific benefit to habitat is worth 
the sort of larger social encouragement it gives the oil companies.” Id. 
40 Id. at 30–31. 
41 Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—De-
commissioning Activities, 30 C.F.R. § 250.1703(f) (2007). 
42 See id. § 250.1703(e)–(f). 
43 Schroeder & Love, supra note 39, at 24–25. For example, rig owners donating to 
Rigs to Reefs may not be required to remove main components of the rig, such as the plat-
form, or to clear the leased area of all obstructions. Id. at 24. 
44 30 C.F.R. § 250.1703. 
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ing a rig.45 Owners must submit applications that require them to make 
plans to protect archaeological and sensitive biological features of the 
environment during the decommissioning process.46 Second, rig own-
ers must either seal or remove supporting components of the rig appa-
ratus that are not necessary to the rig’s function as an artificial reef.47 
Such supporting components generally include wells and pipelines.48 
Third, rig owners must submit final reports describing the rig’s poten-
tial future environmental impacts and the mitigation measures that the 
owners took to minimize such impacts.49 For example, owners must ver-
ify that the rig site has been cleared of unnecessary obstructions and 
has not unnecessarily disturbed the surrounding sea floor.50 
 By exempting rig owners from the costliest decommissioning re-
quirements, while enforcing those requirements related to environ-
mental impacts, the MMS encourages industry participation and helps 
preserve the ocean environment.51 The National Fishing Enhancement 
Act (NFEA), the federal legislation authorizing Rigs to Reefs, similarly 
encourages these goals.52 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. § 250.1703(a). The MMS defines “facility” as “any installation other than a pipe-
line . . . that is permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed on the [Outer Conti-
nental Shelf].” Id. § 250.1700(c). 
46 Id. § 250.1712(f)(14). 
47 Id. § 250.1703(b), (c). 
48 Id. Decommissioning a well requires plugging or sealing it to prevent underground 
materials from leaking up through the well and polluting the surrounding environment. 
Id. §§ 250.1703(b), 250.1714. Decommissioning a pipeline entails either removing it or 
sealing it off by flushing the pipeline of potential pollutants, filling it with seawater, cutting 
and plugging each end of the pipeline, and covering or burying both ends. Id. 
§ 250.1751(c)–(f). Removing the components also ensures that they will not obstruct the 
sea floor and pose a hazard to ship navigation and marine life. See Schroeder & Love, supra 
note 38, at 25. 
49 Schroeder & Love, supra note 38, at 25. These reports are required pursuant to the 
National Environmental Protection Act and corresponding state environmental reporting 
acts. Id. 
50 Id. at 25–26. The MMS defines “obstructions” as “structures, equipment, or objects 
that were used in oil, gas, or sulfur operations or marine growth that, if left in place, would 
hinder other users of the [Outer Continental Shelf].” 30 C.F.R. § 250.1700(b). Obstruc-
tions may include wellheads, platforms, pipelines, and other facilities. Id. 
51 See Dauterive, supra note 11, at iv. 
52 See National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) (2000). 
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II. The Regulatory Structure of Rigs to Reefs 
A. Federal Enabling Legislation and Implementation: The NFEA and the 
National Artificial Reef Plan 
 Congress enacted the NFEA in 1984.53 The statute’s purpose was to 
encourage artificial reef development in general.54 The legislation does 
not refer to Rigs to Reefs by name, but is essential to Rigs to Reefs be-
cause it provides federal agencies with both the authority to create Rigs 
to Reefs and the basic guidelines to implement the program.55 The 
NFEA features two basic categories of guidelines, each dealing with a 
legal and regulatory issue critical to the successful development of arti-
ficial reefs.56 The NFEA’s first category of guidelines allocates responsi-
bility for the development of artificial reefs among federal agencies, 
and requires those agencies to work together to develop a plan to 
achieve the NFEA’s goals.57 The NFEA’s second category of guidelines 
establishes basic strictures governing the legal liability of parties in-
volved in artificial reef development.58 
 The NFEA allocates primary responsibility for artificial reef de-
velopment among three federal agencies.59 The MMS is responsible 
for the implementation and enforcement of rig decommissioning 
regulations.60 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) issues the 
permits that allow for the planning and construction of artificial 
reefs.61 The NMFS serves as the lead agency in the development a 
long-term plan (National Plan or Plan) to achieve the NFEA’s goal of 
encouraging artificial reef development.62 
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. § 2101; see Kaiser & Pulsipher, supra note 24, at 120. 
54 See 33 U.S.C. § 2101(b). 
55 See id. §§ 2102–2103. 
56 See id. §§ 2103–2104. 
57 Id. § 2103. 
58 Id. § 2104(c), (d); see discussion infra Part II.C (discussing liability in Rigs to Reefs in 
additional detail). 
59 33 U.S.C. §§ 2103–2104(a). Other federal agencies play an ancillary role in artificial 
reef development. See id. § 2103. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has the responsibility 
to establish safety zones around offshore facilities, such as rigs, and to enforce fishery laws. 
Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 10–11. Additionally, the Environmental Protection 
Agency is responsible for permitting the transportation for dumping of certain materials 
in ocean waters, and such permitting criteria may apply to certain artificial reef materials 
placed on the ocean floor. Id. 
60 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 5. 
61 33 U.S.C. § 2104(a). The ACE is headed by the Secretary of the Army. Id. 
62 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 6. The NMFS is a division of the U.S. Com-
merce Department. Id. at 5–6. 
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 The National Plan is important because it explicitly establishes 
Rigs to Reefs and provides many of the detailed guidelines necessary to 
implement the program.63 These guidelines are directed at federal 
agencies, which form the foundation of Rigs to Reefs, and at state 
agencies, which are responsible for much of the implementation of the 
program.64 The National Plan contains two important sections.65 The 
first section describes in detail the roles of the federal agencies impli-
cated by the NFEA, namely the MMS, the NMFS, and the ACE.66 The 
Plan limits MMS approval of rigs for use in Rigs to Reefs to those rigs 
designated for such use by a state artificial reef program.67 It also de-
scribes the NMFS’s role in drafting the Plan and coordinating its im-
plementation among the federal agencies.68 Additionally, the Plan re-
fers to specific regulations relating to artificial reef permitting that have 
been promulgated by the ACE since the enactment of the NFEA.69 The 
second section of the Plan provides detailed guidelines for each stage 
of artificial reef development.70 This section includes criteria related to 
reef siting, materials and design, construction, and management.71 The 
NFEA requires these criteria for artificial reef development to be pre-
sent in the Plan.72 
 These two sections of the National Plan provide clear roles and 
tasks for the federal agencies involved in the program.73 However, 
federal agencies only provide the foundation for NFEA enforce-
ment.74 The Plan states that “[t]he Federal role is to provide technical 
                                                                                                                      
63 Id. at 1. The NMFS issued the National Artificial Reef Plan in 1985, and has overseen 
the revision. Id. at v. The Plan was intended to provide additional details to supplement the 
NFEA’s general guidelines. Id. at 1; see 33 U.S.C. § 2103. State plans provide another layer 
of detail critical to implementation of the national plan. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
64 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 4, 11–13. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at 5–11. 
67 Id. at 5. 
68 Id. at 6–7. 
69 Id. at 9. For the purposes of this Note, the details of each agency’s role in Rigs to 
Reefs are less important than the general division of power among the agencies. For ex-
ample, it is sufficient to understand that the ACE is responsible for permitting artificial 
reefs without delving into details of the ACE’s permitting regulations pertaining to artifi-
cial reefs. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 320–30 (2007). 
70 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 15. 
71 Id. 
72 See National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. § 2103 (2000). 
73 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1, 4. Another section of the Plan, describing 
aspects of artificial reef development that require further scientific research, is not rele-
vant to this Note. See id. at 48. 
74 Id. at 1, 11. 
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assistance, guidance, permitting and regulations for the proper use of 
artificial reefs.”75 The federal agencies provide assistance and guid-
ance primarily to state agencies, which are responsible for the bulk of 
the implementation of Rigs to Reefs.76 Not only is this clear enumera-
tion of federal agency roles advantageous for the agencies themselves, 
it is also beneficial for the state actors who must work extensively with 
the federal agencies to implement the program.77 
B. Role of the States Under the National Artificial Reef Plan 
 Under the National Plan, the success of Rigs to Reefs is contingent 
upon state agencies performing two tasks.78 First, the Plan strongly en-
courages states to adopt their own artificial reef plans.79 Second, the 
Plan suggests that states act as the holders of the artificial reef permits 
granted by the federal agencies.80 State artificial reef plans effectively 
serve as more detailed, site-specific versions of the National Plan.81 The 
National Plan indicates that state plans should direct state agencies to 
“assume[] the lead in acquiring permits, . . . financing, constructing, 
researching, and monitoring marine artificial reefs” using state pro-
grams.82 
 Furthermore, the National Plan recommends that states restrict 
eligibility to hold federal artificial reef permits to the states’ own fishery 
management agencies.83 The National Plan gives two reasons for this 
restriction.84 For one, a state’s natural resource agencies hold the pub-
lic trust in managing the state’s resources related to artificial reefs.85 
                                                                                                                      
75 Id. at 4. 
76 Id. at 11 (“Since the implementation of the original Plan in 1985, most state marine 
fisheries agencies have assumed the lead in acquiring permits . . . through state supported 
programs.”). 
77 See id. By providing relatively clear guidelines regarding the role of each federal 
agency, the Plan relieves state actors from devoting time and energy to navigating federal 
bureaucracies. See id. 
78 See id. 
79 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 11. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 1. 
82 Id. at 11–12 (“A state program for artificial reef construction is an integral part of 
any comprehensive state/federal effort to protect, restore or enhance habitats essential to 
valuable commercial and recreational fisheries.”). 
83 Id. at 12 (“Because of the potential long-term effects of artificial reef development 
on the environment and on finfish and shellfish stocks, eligibility to hold a permit to de-
velop an artificial reef . . . should be restricted to the appropriate state fishery manage-
ment agency.”). 
84 See id. 
85 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 12. 
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The agencies’ role as public trustees ensures that artificial reefs will be 
managed with the best interests of the public in mind.86 Moreover, state 
agencies are in the best position to assume the long-term liability neces-
sary to hold an artificial reef permit.87 
 Many coastal states have implemented their own artificial reef 
plans according to the National Plan’s directives.88 For example, the 
State of Louisiana’s plan includes instructions to state agencies to man-
age rig-to-reef conversions off the Louisiana coast, as well as provisions 
that allow state agencies to act as federal permit holders.89 Louisiana 
has made extensive use of Rigs to Reefs because of the prevalence of 
suitable rigs off of the state’s coast.90 Thus, the Louisiana Artificial Reef 
Plan serves as a model for state implementation of Rigs to Reefs.91 
 Louisiana created its artificial reef plan in much the same man-
ner as the NFEA created the National Plan.92 The Louisiana state leg-
islature enacted enabling legislation that delegated the task of creat-
ing a state artificial reef plan to state agencies.93 The primary state 
agency, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), 
produced the Louisiana Artificial Reef Plan after consultation with 
other state agencies, as well as the oil and fishing industries.94 
 Similar to the National Plan’s assignment of federal agency roles, 
the Louisiana Plan delegated the task of implementing the state’s artifi-
cial reef program to state agencies.95 The plan charges the LDWF with 
                                                                                                                      
86 See id. 
87 Id. The NFEA states that a permit holder must demonstrate to the ACE that it has 
“the financial ability to assume liability for all damages that may arise with respect to an 
artificial reef.” National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(3) (2000); 
see discussion infra Part II.C (discussing liability in more detail). 
88 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 11; see, e.g., Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, 
Massachusetts Marine Artificial Reef Plan 1, 37 (2006), available at http://www.mass. 
gov/dfwele/dmf/programsandprojects/draft_ma_artificial_reef_plan_ii_111706.pdf. 
89 Louisiana Fishing Enhancement Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 56:639.9(A) (1987); La. 
Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 42. 
90 Kaiser & Pulsipher, supra note 23, at 126. 
91 See id. 126–27; La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at vii. Louisiana 
was the first gulf state to create an artificial reef program based on the NFEA. Id. 
92 Compare National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106 (2000) 
(delegating responsibility to create the National Plan to the NMFS), with La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 56:639.6(B)–.7 (delegating the responsibility to create a state plan to the Louisiana 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries). 
93 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 56:639.6(B)–.7. Such enabling legislation was necessary to 
provide the Louisiana artificial reef program with the proper founding authority. La. 
Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 23, at 7. 
94 La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 39–40. Chief among these in-
terest groups were members of the fishermen’s lobby. Id. at 40. 
95 Id. at 41. 
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primary responsibility for administering and enforcing the program, 
including developing permit applications.96 The LDWF’s Artificial Reef 
Development Fund assures that the reef program is adequately fi-
nanced.97 Finally, two agencies associated with Louisiana State Univer-
sity provide scientific and technical support for reef site selection and 
development.98 
 State agencies, therefore, play a primary role in the reef develop-
ment process.99 State artificial reef plans provide for the specific im-
plementation of the general guidelines set out in the NFEA and the 
National Plan.100 Moreover, state agencies may act as federal permit 
holders, and thus, accept liability if legal issues arise in the Rigs to Reefs 
program.101 The proper apportioning of liability is critical to the suc-
cess of Rigs to Reefs because, without it, industry would be discouraged 
from participating in the program.102 
C. Treatment of Liability in the Rigs to Reefs Program 
 Rigs to Reefs relies on extensive industry participation to be suc-
cessful; without industry donations of rigs, Rigs to Reefs would not ex-
ist.103 Rigs to Reefs provides the oil industry with an incentive to par-
ticipate by allowing the industry to avoid many of the decommissioning 
costs associated with obsolete rigs.104 It is likely that this cost-saving in-
centive would be greatly negated if industry donors were subject to le-
gal liability for accidents that occurred while converting a rig to a 
reef.105 However, reef permit holders would be unlikely to accept and 
bear the cost of rigs that industry has negligently decommissioned or 
                                                                                                                      
96 Id. at 42. 
97 Id. at 8. 
98 Id. at 41–43. These two agencies are the Louisiana Geological Survey (LGS) and the 
Center for Wetland Resources (CWR). Id. at 41. The LGS assists the LDWF in developing 
criteria for reef placement and by coordinating permitting procedures at the state and 
federal level. Id. at 42. The CWR provides the LDWF with criteria for the selection and 
development of sites and technical assistance for program development. Id. at 43. 
99 See id. at 41. 
100 See National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3), (d) (2000); 
La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 42; Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, 
supra note 88, at 30. 
101 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 12. 
102 See Dauterive, supra note 11, at iv, 4; Schroeder & Love, supra note 38, at 29. 
103 Dauterive, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
104 Id. at iv. The oil industry is spared the cost of removing the structures and towing 
them to land for disposal. Id. at 4. 
105 See, e.g., Decommissioning Costs, supra note 11, at app. B-1, B-2. For example, the 
MMS estimates that potential legal liability for just four rigs could exceed $1 billion. Id. 
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prepared for donation.106 Thus, for Rigs to Reefs to operate effectively, 
it is critical for federal and state agencies to set clear guidelines that 
fairly apportion liability among donors and permit holders.107 
 At the conception of Rigs to Reefs, Congress and the federal and 
state agencies recognized the importance of addressing the liability 
issue.108 First, the NFEA, the enabling legislation of the federal artifi-
cial reef program, devoted a section to liability.109 Next, the National 
Plan elaborated on the NFEA’s general treatment of liability through 
a discussion of the impact of liability on private parties that partici-
pate in the reef development process.110 Finally, state plans such as the 
Louisiana Artificial Reef Plan implemented the directives of the NFEA 
and the National Plan concerning liability on the state level.111 
 The NFEA deals with liability by establishing broad directives that 
provide a basic framework for the treatment of liability in the federal 
artificial reef program.112 The NFEA addresses liability as it pertains to 
the federal government, to permit holders, and to donors of mate-
rial.113 The NFEA’s liability section immunizes the federal government 
from liability to the greatest extent possible under the law.114 The legis-
lation also addresses the potential liability of permit holders.115 The 
statute states that permit holders are immune from liability as long as 
they comply with the terms and conditions of the permit.116 This acts as 
both an assurance to permit holders and a directive to federal agencies 
to ensure that permit conditions are clear and can be easily followed by 
                                                                                                                      
106 See id. 
107 See Schroeder & Love, supra note 38, at 28–29. 
108 See National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3), (d) (2000). 
109 Id. § 2104. 
110 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 45–47. The National Plan divided the reef 
development process into three stages: planning and permitting, construction, and moni-
toring. Id. at 38–39. 
111 La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 8; Mass. Div. of Marine 
Fisheries, supra note 88, at 30; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 2103–2104; Reef Plan Revision, supra 
note 14, at 47. 
112 See 33 U.S.C. § 2104. 
113 Id. § 2104(c)–(d). 
114 Id. § 2104(d) (“Nothing in this chapter creates any liability on the part of the United 
States.”). As the National Plan indicates, the statute may not cover all liability issues involving 
the federal government. Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 46. If not covered by the stat-
ute, liability issues “will require reference to maritime law, sovereign immunity, and tradi-
tional tort concepts.” Id. 
115 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c). 
116 Id. § 2104(c)(1) (“A person to whom a permit is issued . . . shall not be liable for 
damages . . . if the permittee is in compliance with [the] terms and conditions [of the 
permit].”). 
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applicants.117 Yet the NFEA also clearly states that if a permit holder 
deviates from the terms of the permit, that permit holder must accept 
any accompanying liability.118 Thus, under the NFEA, the burden falls 
first on the government to draft clear permit conditions, and then on 
the permit holder to comply with such conditions.119 
 The NFEA further addresses permit holder liability by qualifying 
the receipt of a permit on a permit holder’s “financial ability to assume 
liability for all damages that may arise with respect to an artificial 
reef.”120 This qualification has effectively limited the class of reef permit 
holders to those with substantial financial resources.121 Private parties 
have been unwilling to commit the financial resources necessary to 
qualify as permit holders under the NFEA, leaving state agencies as the 
only entities willing and able to hold artificial reef permits.122 
 Although the NFEA has effectively precluded private parties from 
holding rig permits, the statute does provide qualified immunity for 
private donors of rigs or rig materials.123 Under the NFEA, any person 
who transfers title to a rig, or transfers reef construction materials to a 
permit holder, cannot be held liable for damages arising from the use 
of such materials so long as it meets certain criteria established by the 
ACE and other federal agencies.124 By establishing broad rules govern-
ing potential liability for the federal government, permit holders, and 
donors, the NFEA provides basic guidelines for the National Plan.125 
 The National Plan adheres to the NFEA’s broad guidelines re-
garding liability, but discusses them in much greater detail.126 The 
                                                                                                                      
117 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 47. Clarity in the drafting of permit con-
ditions is essential to ensure the confidence of permit holders. See id. However, legal ques-
tion may still arise over what constitutes compliance with permit conditions, especially 
given the National Plan’s emphasis on “strict adherence to all the terms of the permit.” See 
id. at 39. 
118 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c). 
119 See id. § 2104(c)(1)–(2); Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 47. 
120 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(3). 
121 See Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, supra note 89, at 37. 
122 Id. As this Note will argue, the NFEA’s financial qualification for holding reef per-
mits has substantially limited the scope and effectiveness of Rigs to Reefs. See discussion 
infra Part II.B.2. 
123 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(4); Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, supra note 88, at 37. 
124 See 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(4). The ACE’s criteria is discussed in more detail in the Na-
tional Plan. Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 9. In addition to ACE guidelines, rig 
materials may need to conform to the regulations of other federal agencies. See id. at 7–8. 
For example, Environmental Protection Agency regulations regarding materials suitable 
for ocean dumping may apply to certain materials used in reef construction. Id. at 8. 
125 See 33 U.S.C. § 2106; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 3. 
126 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 45–47. 
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Plan addresses the application of NFEA’s liability rules to the federal 
government, permit holders, and donors.127 The Plan confirms that 
the NFEA creates no liability on the part of the United States, but 
then discusses ways that the United States may be liable under other 
statutes that are applicable to offshore rigs.128 For example, the Plan 
explains that the United States may be liable under the Suits in Admi-
ralty Act for injuries or damage resulting from the maritime actions of 
the federal government.129 Under the Suits in Admiralty Act, if the 
ACE negligently authorized placement of a reef, the United States 
may be liable for any damage that resulted from that negligence.130 
 The federal government may also be liable if the ACE fails to fulfill 
the NFEA’s baseline requirements for the placement and siting of 
reefs.131 The NFEA requires that artificial reef construction minimize 
environmental risks, and that the placement of a reef not create an un-
reasonable hazard to navigation.132 If the ACE issues permits that allow 
environmentally damaging materials, or authorizes a reef that creates a 
hazard to navigation, the federal government may be liable for the 
ACE’s actions.133 Another potential source of permit holder liability is 
the lack of compliance with systematic monitoring of each new reef.134 
If permit holders do not comply with the systematic monitoring re-
quirements, they may be held liable for accidents involving the reef.135 
                                                                                                                      
127 Id. at 46. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.; see Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30,901–30,911 (2000). 
130 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 46; see 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741–745. The Plan 
notes that certain courts have implied an exemption from liability under the Suits in Ad-
miralty Act for discretionary functions of the federal government. Reef Plan Revision, 
supra note 14, at 46. These courts have drawn on the concept of federal sovereign immu-
nity to conclude that such an exemption from liability exists. Id. Under this analysis, a de-
cision by a federal agency such as the ACE to permit a reef in a particular place, or to re-
quire certain materials for construction, would not create any liability applicable to the 
federal government, even if the agency knew that there were risks involved. Id. The federal 
government could be liable under this scenario only if the federal agency did not follow 
the NFEA’s explicit requirements. Id. 
131 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 46. 
132 See National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. § 2102 (2000); Reef Plan 
Revision, supra note 14, at 32. 
133 See 33 U.S.C. § 2102; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 46. 
134 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 47; see 33 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2). 
135 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 47. The Plan notes that there should be 
only a slight possibility of liability as long as the reef has been appropriately located, 
marked on navigation charts, and the required surface markers are attached to the reef. 
Id. Additionally, users of an artificial reef assume some risk of injury, just as visitors to pub-
lic parks do. Id. 
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 After discussing federal government liability, the Plan addresses 
the NFEA’s treatment of permit holder liability.136 The Plan recom-
mends that each state restrict eligibility to hold reef permits to that 
state’s natural resource agencies.137 According to the Plan, state agen-
cies should be the sole holders of reef permits because they are the 
only entities with the financial ability to assume all liability, as required 
by the NFEA.138 However, the Plan leaves open the possibility for a state 
to extend its authority to hold permits to other entities, as long as the 
state informs the ACE that it has done so.139 
 In addition to federal government and permit holder liability, the 
Plan supplements the NFEA’s guidelines for donor liability.140 The Plan 
echoes the NFEA’s assurances that donors will not be liable for acci-
dents involving donated materials, as long as such materials meet the 
Plan’s requirements.141 Yet the Plan also cautions donors to verify that 
materials meet Plan guidelines and to document title transfers to en-
sure that donors’ liability terminates upon donation.142 
 Finally, the National Plan briefly addresses the liability implications 
of private-party participation in reef construction, an area of liability 
that is not discussed in the NFEA.143 The Plan acknowledges that pri-
vate parties often will participate in reef construction as volunteers or 
contractors of the permit holder.144 Because a properly drafted permit 
specifies the location and procedures of reef construction, permit 
                                                                                                                      
136 Id. at 46–47. 
137 Id. at 11–12. 
138 Id.; see Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, supra note 88, at 37. In addition, state 
agencies should act as the sole permit holders because the states’ natural resource agen-
cies hold the public trust in managing resources associated with artificial reefs. Reef Plan 
Revision, supra note 14, at 11–12. 
139 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 11–12. Thus, the Plan appears to contem-
plate the possibility of private parties holding reef permits. See id. As this Note will argue, 
Rigs to Renewables would not have to rely on states extending their permit–holding au-
thority to private parties because the ability of private parties to hold permits would be 
built into the program’s federal enabling legislation. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
140 See id. 
141 Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(4). The Plan establishes criteria for reef materials based 
on the materials’ function, compatibility, stability, and durability. Reef Plan Revision, 
supra note 14, at 30–31. The Plan also describes the types of materials a permit holder may 
accept, including secondary-use materials, natural materials, and manufactured reef struc-
tures. Id. at 31–33. 
142 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 47. Although the Plan focuses on donor li-
ability, it also calls attention to the benefits that donors receive from donation, including 
treatment of the donation as a charitable contribution for tax purposes and favorable pub-
licity for the donor. Id. at 33. 
143 Id. at 47; see 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(4). 
144 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 47. 
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holders need only ensure that their contractors or volunteers strictly 
adhere to permit requirements to be immunized from liability under 
the NFEA.145 
 Using the National Plan as a guide, states like Louisiana address 
liability concerns specific to their situations.146 Just as the NFEA and the 
National Plan address liability concerns on the federal level, the Louisi-
ana Fishing Enhancement Act (LFEA) and the Louisiana Artificial Reef 
Plan address liability issues specific to the State of Louisiana.147 The 
LFEA designates the State of Louisiana as the permit holder for artifi-
cial reefs developed under the National Plan, ensuring state control 
over reef permitting and development.148 The LFEA does not, however, 
foreclose the possibility that other groups could hold reef permits.149 
Language in the LFEA indicates that the state may allow private parties 
to hold rig development permits.150 Before being allowed to hold such 
permits, however, private parties must demonstrate that they have the 
financial ability to assume all liability for the structure, as required by 
the NFEA.151 
 Private parties generally donate the structures and materials that 
comprise an artificial reef.152 Louisiana acknowledges this fact by includ-
ing in its reef plan a Donation Agreement to be signed by the state 
agency and the private donor.153 The Donation Agreement stipulates 
that the donor accepts liability for the donated structure until the struc-
ture is delivered and the state mails a Notification of Acceptance.154 This 
                                                                                                                      
145 Id. 
146 La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 8. Massachusetts’s state reef 
plan also has a comprehensive section addressing liability. Mass. Div. of Marine Fisher-
ies, supra note 88, at 36. 
147 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 2104 (requiring the ACE to ensure that permit holders have 
the financial ability to assume liability), and Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 46–47 
(addressing liability at all stages of reef development), with Louisiana Fishing Enhance-
ment Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 56:639.10 (1987) (designating State of Louisiana as permt 
holder), and La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 8 (providing for poten-
tial relief from liability for Louisiana permit holders). 
148 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 56:639.9(A). 
149 See id. § 56:639.9(B)(4). 
150 Id. (“The . . . Department of Wildlife and Fisheries . . . [shall] insure that artificial 
reef permits sought by groups other than Louisiana are consistent with the state plan de-
veloped under this Subpart and the National Fishing Enhancement Act.”). 
151 See 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(3); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 56:639.9(A)(4). 
152 Dauterive, supra note 11, at iv; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 47. 
153 See La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at app. VII. 
154 Id. at app.VII § 7.1. 
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Donation Agreement helps to ensure that both the state and the donor 
follow the NFEA’s guidelines regarding private-party liability.155 
 Rigs to Reefs’ treatment of liability is effective because it makes 
efficient use of a hierarchal framework.156 Federal agencies set broad 
guidelines for the program, while state agencies provide the specific 
details necessary for implementation of those guidelines on the state 
level.157 Incorporating this framework into Rigs to Renewables would 
ensure that the program has the broad federal guidance and specific 
state implementation that has proven to be effective in Rigs to Reefs.158 
III. Rigs to Renewables: Incorporating and Improving the Rigs 
to Reefs Framework 
A. The Rigs to Renewables Program 
 The Rigs to Renewables program would use old offshore oil rigs as 
renewable energy stations.159 Like Rigs to Reefs, Rigs to Renewables 
would promote conservation, while providing reduced decommission-
ing costs as an incentive for the oil industry to donate rigs to the pro-
gram.160 In addition to creating this incentive for industry, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 provides grant funding and tax breaks for alternative 
energy development that may apply to donees who hold permits to de-
velop the rigs.161 Because both rig donors and donees would have in-
centives to participate in the program, Rigs to Renewables could be a 
viable, pragmatic approach to alternative energy development.162 
 The aim of this Note is to propose a legal and regulatory frame-
work for Rigs to Renewables. Such a framework should be based on 
three pillars, which collectively incorporate the advantages of Rigs to 
Reefs and improve on its flaws.163 First, Rigs to Renewables should draw 
                                                                                                                      
155 See id. 
156 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 45–47. 
157 See id.; see, e.g., La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 7. 
158 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 45–47; see, e.g., La. Dep’t of Wildlife & 
Fisheries, supra note 22, at 7. 
159 Geoghegan, supra note 8, at 34. 
160 See Dauterive, supra note 11, at iv; Alex De Alessi, Private Reef Building: Two 
Case Studies 2 (1997); see, e.g., Decommissioning Costs, supra note 11, at ii tbl.1. 
161 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 1, at 4. The Energy Policy Act does not spe-
cifically mention rig donees, but the Act includes tax credits for renewable energy produc-
tion. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13,317(b)–(c) (2005 & Supp. 2007); 
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 1, at 4. 
162 See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 4293; U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 1, at 4. 
163 See 33 U.S.C. § 2103; La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 7–8; 
Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1. 
2008] Alternative Energy Development: Rigs to Renewables 339 
on the basic regulatory structure of the Rigs to Reefs program: a fed-
eral enabling statute, broad federal guidance, and detailed implemen-
tation by the states.164 Second, Rigs to Renewables should permit 
greater state control over the program than is currently allowed in Rigs 
to Reefs. This approach would enable more flexible approaches in 
achieving program goals.165 Third, the federal and state agencies in 
charge of Rigs to Renewables should regulate in a way that encourages 
private parties to hold rig-development permits, thereby greatly increas-
ing the impact of the program.166 Taking these three steps would in-
corporate the hierarchal structure that is the strength of Rigs to Reefs, 
while addressing the inflexibility that is the program’s primary weak-
ness.167 
B. Incorporating the Rigs to Reefs Framework 
 Rigs to Renewables should incorporate the basic structure that 
underlies the Rigs to Reefs program because such a structure provides 
a clear delineation of the roles of federal and state agencies.168 The 
NFEA, as the enabling legislation for the federal artificial reef program, 
is the legal authority for Rigs to Reefs.169 The NFEA delegates permit-
granting authority to the ACE, and grants authority to coordinate 
agency efforts to create the National Plan to the NMFS.170 It is likely 
that the MMS and the ACE would have similar roles under Rigs to Re-
newables as they do under Rigs to Reefs.171 Thus, an enabling statute 
for Rigs to Renewables would contain language similar to the language 
                                                                                                                      
164 See 33 U.S.C. § 2103 (providing basic guidelines for authorities to use in implement-
ing the program); La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 7–8 (describing 
state implementation of the National Plan); Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1 (pro-
viding more detailed direction to federal and state agencies). 
165 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 11–13. 
166 See De Alessi, supra note 160, at 2–4. 
167 See 33 U.S.C. § 2103; La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, supra note 22, at 7–8; Reef 
Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 1. The structure of Rigs to Reefs is more complex than the 
three tiers presented here. See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 8. For example, Rigs to 
Reefs also envisions roles for local governments, non-profit organizations, and concerned 
interest groups. Id. at 11–12. This Note does not propose to incorporate every aspect of Rigs 
to Reefs into Rigs to Renewables, only its basic structure. See id. at 9–12. 
168 See Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 4. Not only does a clear delineation of 
agency roles provide for the more efficient operation of government, it provides program 
participants-—whether industry donors or permit holders—with certainty regarding pro-
gram procedures. See id. 
169 33 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106. 
170 Id. §§ 2103–2104. 
171 See id.; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 5, 7. The MMS oversees renewable 
energy and alternative uses in ocean waters. Id. at 6, 11–13. 
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in the NFEA.172 An enabling statute is necessary to provide the explicit 
legal authority for Rigs to Renewables, and it should be drafted using 
NFEA as a model.173 
 The National Plan elaborates on the roles of the federal agencies 
described in the NFEA, and supplements the NFEA by emphasizing the 
critical role that state agencies play in the Rigs to Reefs program.174 Be-
cause state agencies would play a similarly crucial part in Rigs to Re-
newables, and describing these roles in detail would be beyond the pale 
of a Congressional statute, a national plan similar to the National Arti-
ficial Reef Plan likely would be necessary for Rigs to Renewables to suc-
ceed.175 
 The National Plan’s section on state agencies provides examples of 
areas where state agency action is critical to Rigs to Reefs; in these ar-
eas, the NFEA provides only general comments.176 For example, the 
National Plan describes how state agencies should address industry li-
ability concerns, specifically, by acting as the holders of federal per-
mits.177 Additionally, the National Plan suggests that state agencies work 
with local governments within their states to coordinate reef construc-
tion programs and publicize local reef efforts, among other activities.178 
Aside from brief instructions on permit holding and working with local 
governments, however, the National Plan provides little guidance to 
state agencies.179 
 By acting as permit holders, states are the linchpin of Rigs to 
Reefs’ approach to handling potential liability.180 Yet the NFEA’s section 
on liability does not mention state agencies, presumably leaving the 
task of defining the agencies’ roles to the National Plan, which can pro-
vide for more detailed treatment of states and liability than possible in 
NFEA.181 Moreover, the NFEA does not mention the relationship be-
tween state and local governments, which is thoroughly presented in 
the National Plan.182 These examples demonstrate how the National 
                                                                                                                      
172 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106. 
173 See id. 
174 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 7–13. 
175 See id. 
176 See 33 U.S.C. § 2103; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 11–13. 
177 Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 12. 
178 Id. at 13. Other areas of potential cooperation between state and local governments 
include providing technical support for community efforts, furnishing financial assistance 
to reef programs, and obtaining state funding for local reef efforts. Id. 
179 See id. at 11–13. 
180 See id. at 12. 
181 See 33 U.S.C. § 2104; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 12. 
182 See 33 U.S.C. § 2104; Reef Plan Revision, supra note 14, at 13–14. 
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Plan includes critical aspects of Rigs to Reefs that are beyond the scope 
of an enabling statute like the NFEA.183 Therefore, it is likely that Rigs 
to Renewables, because it is similar to Rigs to Reefs, would also require 
a national plan.184 Such a plan would provide the details to supplement 
the enabling statute’s general guidelines, and would coordinate the 
actions of state agencies, which would be largely responsible for the 
actual implementation of the program.185 
 In Rigs to Reefs, state agencies provide for the implementation of 
the program by creating individualized state artificial reef plans.186 To 
benefit from the clear delineation of agency roles that is the advan-
tage of the Rigs to Reefs system, Rigs to Renewables should require 
detailed state plans similar to those in Rigs to Reefs.187 State plans are 
essential to the success of a national program such as Rigs to Renew-
ables for two reasons. First, state plans can consider conditions par-
ticular to the state that would affect the implementation of Rigs to 
Renewables.188 For example, the Louisiana Artificial Reef Plan estab-
lished artificial reef planning zones, which encourage artificial reef 
development in some offshore areas and discourage it in others, 
based on characteristics particular to the locale, such as hydrological 
and geologic conditions.189 These development zones are critical to 
effective reef development in Louisiana.190 Because the National Plan 
is unable to account for the particular characteristics of every state 
participating in Rigs to Reefs, state plans play an important role in 
providing such details.191 
 Second, states can take advantage of the small scale of their reef 
programs to implement creative solutions that are not possible at the 
national level.192 For example, the Louisiana Artificial Reef Plan notes 
that state and local groups in Florida have acquired and transported 
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rigs from the coast of Louisiana, where they are plentiful, to the coast 
of Florida, where they are less numerous.193 Florida then used the rigs 
in its own Rigs to Reefs program.194 The national focus of the NFEA 
and the National Plan prevent federal agencies from realizing oppor-
tunities for creative solutions, such as the cooperative effort between 
Louisiana and Florida, that arise on the state level.195 Delegating the 
bulk of responsibility enables the states to act as laboratories and to 
devise new ways to implement the goals set out in the National Plan.196 
 In sum, Rigs to Renewables should make use of the three-tiered 
structure underlying Rigs to Reefs because such a structure would pro-
vide clear roles for federal and state agencies.197 An enabling statute 
like the NFEA would provide the legal authority for Rigs to Renew-
ables.198 A national plan would provide the details necessary to deline-
ate the roles of federal agencies in the program.199 Finally, state plans 
would allocate responsibility for implementing Rigs to Renewables 
among the state agencies, giving them the flexibility to respond to local 
conditions and adopt creative solutions to alternative energy develop-
ment.200 
C. Improving the Rigs to Reefs Framework 
 While Rigs to Renewables should adopt Rigs to Reefs’ approach of 
delegating the bulk of responsibility to the states, the program should 
improve on the Rigs to Reefs framework in two ways. First, Rigs to Re-
newables should allow the ACE to delegate permitting responsibility to 
qualified states, which would likely process permits more efficiently 
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than the ACE.201 Second, the federal and state agencies governing Rigs 
to Renewables should regulate to encourage private parties to hold rig 
development permits.202 The NFEA effectively limits the class of permit 
holders to public agencies, which limits Rigs to Reefs’ impact because 
there are fewer participants in the program.203 By giving greater re-
sponsibility to states and to private parties than they possess under Rigs 
to Reefs, Rigs to Renewables would increase program participation and 
enhance program effectiveness.204 
1. Delegating Permitting Responsibility to the States 
 States could process permits more efficiently than the ACE.205 
Increased efficiency in permit processing would act as an incentive to 
potential permit holders to apply for permits.206 Increasing the num-
ber of permit holders, in turn, would achieve a primary goal of Rigs to 
Renewables of utilizing the basic Rigs to Reefs model and expanding 
on the model’s scope and effectiveness.207 
 While states do not have permitting power under Rigs to Reefs, 
other environmental programs allow the ACE to delegate its permitting 
power to the states.208 For example, the ACE has delegated its wetlands 
permitting power under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) to 
the states of New Jersey and Michigan.209 The CWA permitting program 
is similar to the structure of Rigs to Reefs in that both programs involve 
extensive cooperation between federal and state agencies.210 Moreover, 
like Rigs to Reefs, the CWA relies on states to implement much of the 
program’s federal guidelines and regulations.211 Since the ACE dele-
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gated its CWA permitting power to New Jersey and Michigan, the per-
mitting process in those states has improved.212 
 By giving states control of the permit process, while allowing the 
ACE to retain oversight, Rigs to Renewables would improve the effi-
ciency of the Rigs to Reefs permit process, while still providing for the 
federal agency oversight.213 Increased efficiency in the permit process 
likely would stimulate participation in Rigs to Renewables, particularly 
when coupled with regulations that encourage private parties to hold 
rig development permits.214 
2. Encouraging Private Parties to Hold Rig Permits 
 Encouraging private parties to hold rig development permits not 
only may increase participation in Rigs to Renewables, it may stimulate 
innovation by private parties in reef development.215 But in order to 
encourage private parties to participate, Rigs to Renewables would 
need to adopt less restrictive liability rules than Rigs to Reefs.216 The 
NFEA requires a permit holder to demonstrate the financial ability to 
assume liability for all damages that may arise with respect to an artifi-
cial reef.217 Requiring permit holders to assume all liability effectively 
precludes private parties from holding reef permits because most pri-
vate parties are unwilling or unable to expose themselves to such finan-
cial risk.218 By effectively excluding private parties from reef develop-
ment, the NFEA eliminates a potential source of innovation and limits 
the effectiveness of Rigs to Reefs.219 Rigs to Renewables should encour-
age innovation by allowing private permit holders to share liability ex-
posure with the states instead of assuming all liability themselves.220 
 The state artificial reef programs in Alabama and Florida provide 
evidence of the positive impact of private innovation on state reef pro-
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grams.221 Most states restrict reef development to state agencies.222 
However, Alabama and Florida allow private parties to develop artificial 
reefs in limited areas.223 Private parties may construct and site reefs 
within these areas, but after construction is complete, the private par-
ties must transfer title of the reefs to the state.224 The state, as permit 
holder, then assumes all liability for the use of the reef as required un-
der the NFEA.225 
 Allowing private parties to play a greater role in reef development 
and construction is a relatively minor innovation within the NFEA’s re-
strictive liability rules.226 Yet even this minor innovation has increased 
the scope and effectiveness of the artificial reef programs in Alabama 
and Florida.227 Soon after Alabama began allowing private reef con-
struction, the number of reefs developed off the Alabama coast sky-
rocketed.228 Eventually the increase in the number of reefs led to a 
dramatic rise in the number of fish caught off of Alabama’s shores, 
though surrounding states with more traditional reef programs experi-
enced no such increases.229 By allowing private parties to play a leading 
role in reef construction, Alabama was able to implement Rigs to Reefs’ 
directive to enhance offshore fisheries more effectively than those states 
that relied solely on public agencies for reef development.230 
 While the success of the program in Alabama demonstrates the 
effectiveness of private participation, the liability rules set out in the 
NFEA limit the ability of state reef programs to increase private par-
ticipation.231 Private parties generally have been willing to participate 
in reef construction, but they have not been as willing to act as permit 
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holders because of the NFEA’s requirement that permit holders ac-
cept all liability for potential damages involving a reef.232 
 If it were not for the NFEA’s liability rules, private parties likely 
would apply for rig development permits because of the potential eco-
nomic benefits of holding such permits.233 Chief among these benefits 
would be the permit holder’s exclusive right of access to the reef, for at 
least a period of time.234 In contrast, even under the Alabama reef pro-
gram, the only economic incentive to private participation is the in-
formal guarantee that private participants will be the first to learn of 
newly constructed reefs and thereby can be the first to exploit them 
until the location of the reefs becomes known.235 
 Since allowing private parties to hold permits would benefit both 
private parties and the entire Rigs to Renewables program, Rigs to Re-
newables should restructure the NFEA’s restrictive liability guide-
lines.236 By creating liability rules that encourage private participation, 
Rigs to Renewables could allow states and private parties to innovate 
and increase the effectiveness of state programs.237 Because Rigs to Re-
newables would be a cooperative effort between government and pri-
vate groups, Rigs to Renewables should look to other public-private 
joint ventures in structuring its liability rules.238 Other public-private 
joint ventures make use of shared liability to encourage private partici-
pation.239 For example, both the United States and British governments 
provide terrorism reinsurance programs to stimulate industry partici-
pation and lower prices in the terrorism insurance market.240 In the 
United States, private insurers assume all liability for terrorism damages 
up to a certain dollar amount.241 Once that dollar amount is exceeded, 
private insurers split the excess liability costs evenly with the federal 
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government, again up to a certain dollar amount.242 If that amount is 
surpassed, the federal government assumes all remaining liability for 
terrorism damages.243 This system encourages private participation be-
cause private insurers can be certain of the extent of their liability, and 
can therefore more easily quantify their risk.244 
 Rather than requiring private permit holders to assume all liability 
themselves, Rigs to Renewables should utilize a similar system of shared 
liability to encourage private participation.245 As permit holders, private 
parties should be required to assume all liability up to a certain dollar 
amount.246 The states should assume any liability beyond that amount.247 
Unlike the Rigs to Reefs liability rules, in which private permit holders’ 
liability is theoretically unlimited, such shared liability would encourage 
private parties to participate in Rigs to Renewables because their poten-
tial liability would be limited to a set dollar amount.248 Increased private 
participation would stimulate innovation and enhance Rigs to Renew-
ables’ ability to promote alternative energy development.249 
Conclusion 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 indicates that the regulatory climate 
surrounding renewable energy is as favorable as it has ever been. Rigs 
to Renewables would exploit the incentives for renewable energy pro-
vided by the Act, while minimizing NIMBY opposition and providing 
significant cost savings to oil industry donors. But, in addition to offer-
ing compelling political and economic incentives, Rigs to Renewables 
must also be based on a solid legal and regulatory framework to be suc-
cessful in attaining its energy development goals. This framework must 
delineate public and private roles in the areas of agency jurisdiction, 
permitting authority, and legal liability, yet be flexible enough to re-
spond to specific needs at the local level. 
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 Rigs to Renewables should adopt the Rigs to Reefs regulatory 
framework because that framework provides a clear delineation of roles 
and delegation of authority. National enabling legislation provides the 
legal authority for the program, and includes basic guidelines as to 
agency roles, permitting regulations, and liability. A national plan 
elaborates on the enabling legislation’s basic guidelines, particularly as 
applied to the role of federal agencies in the program. The bulk of re-
sponsibility for implementing the program is delegated to the states. 
The states then promulgate state plans that allocate responsibility 
among the state agencies and respond to local conditions. 
 Rigs to Renewables should improve the Rigs to Reefs framework by 
allowing states greater flexibility to implement their own solutions to 
alternative energy development. Rigs to Reefs’ rules regarding permit-
ting authority and liability effectively preclude states from improvising 
and prevent private parties from participating in the program. Rigs to 
Renewables should adopt rules better suited to increase program par-
ticipation and effectiveness. The program should allow states to assume 
full responsibility for permitting from the federal government, as is 
done under environmental statutes like the CWA. Additionally, Rigs to 
Renewables should encourage private parties to hold rig development 
permits by explicitly providing for such parties in its enabling legisla-
tion, and by endorsing a shared liability scheme similar to arrange-
ments that exist in other public-private joint ventures. Incorporating 
the Rigs to Reefs framework with these key modifications will ensure 
that Rigs to Renewables is best able to achieve its goal of providing 
clean, independent sources of renewable energy. 
